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THE REINCORPORATION PROBLEM IN SUBCHAPTER C:
A QUESTION OF SEMANTICS?
R. P. HERTZOG*
INTRODUCTION
Because of the substantial difference in the tax rates applicable to
dividend income and those applicable to capital gains, the provisions of
Subchapter C' have been utilized in a variety of ways to effect the
transformation of dividend income into capital gain.
Generally speaking, the ordinary income tax on the profits of a cor-
poration at the shareholder level may be deferred by retaining such
profits in the corporation, subject to the accumulated earnings tax pro-
visions.2 Thereafter, those retained earnings may be, in effect, obtained
by the shareholder, and at the favorable capital gain rates, through a
complete liquidation of the corporation.3 In some cases, however, tax-
payers have sought to obtain similar treatment with respect to dis-
tributions by a corporation while retaining some or all of the business
assets in corporate solution. In its simpler form, this "bailout" has taken
the form of direct distributions of stock, securities, or assets, with the
distributing corporation remaining in existence. In its more complex
form, however, the "bailout" has been effected through the use of more
than one corporation. In this latter case, the transaction typically has
been cast in the form of a complete liquidation of the corporation fol-
lowed by a transfer of the assets desired to be retained in corporate
solution to a newly-organized corporation controlled by the same or
substantially the same shareholders.
Under the 1954 Code, where the bailout has taken the form of a direct
distribution from a continuing corporation, the controversy has centered
upon those provisions of the Code designed to preserve dividend treat-
ment where the distribution has the effect of a dividend, e.g., sections
306, 346, or 355. However, where the bailout has taken the form of a
complete liquidation followed by a reincorporation, the controversy has
* Associate Chief Counsel (Litigation), Office of the Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue
Service; LL.B., Catholic University; Member, D. C. Bar.
1. Subchapter C, Chapter 1, Subtitle A, of the INT. REv. CODE OF 1954.
2. INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 531, et seq. (References to the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954
will hereinafter be made by section number only. References to the definitional sub-
section of the reorganization provisions will be made by paragraph letter.)
3. Section 331.
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centered upon whether tax effect must be given to each step of the
transaction or whether the transaction properly can be recast within
the provisions of Subchapter C to deny the tax consequences of a com-
plete liquidation. It is this latter problem with which this article deals.
Actually, the bailout of earnings and profits is only one context in
which the reincorporation problem exists. Simply stated, the problem is
presented in every case where a taxpayer, for whatever reason, seeks
complete liquidation treatment while continuing a substantial measure
of the corporate enterprise in corporate solution. Thus, the recognition
of losses, the non-recognition of gains at the corporate level, or the
acquisition of a stepped-up basis, are all tax consequences which might
accompany the complete liquidation of a corporation and which a
shareholder might wish to achieve without abandoning the corporate
vehicle.
EARLY ADM \INISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSE
The reincorporation problem existed prior to the enactment of the
1954 Code. Thus, in Sur'aunt v. Commissioner,4 the two shareholders of
a corporation had individual promissory notes outstanding which they
desired their corporation to assume. They were advised that state law
prohibited such a transaction. Accordingly, the following plan was
adopted: The corporation was liquidated and its assets were transferred
by the two shareholders to a new corporation in exchange for all
of its common stock and notes in a principal amount equal to the in-
debtedness of the individuals. Subsequently, these notes were transferred
to the creditors of the individuals. The individuals claimed capital losses
on the liquidation and the corporation claimed a stepped-up basis in the
assets. The court sustained the Commissioner's contention that, viewing
the various steps as a single plan, a D reorganization 5 existed, with the
result that the new corporation was required to carry-over the lower
basis of the old corporation, and the shareholders were not entitled to
recognize their "loss". In answering the taxpayers' contention, based
upon the Supreme Court's opinion in Gregory v. Helvering,6 that lack
,of business purpose precluded the finding of a reorganization, the court
4. 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947), aff'g 5 T.C. 665 (1945).
5. "The term 'reorganization' means . . . (D) a transfer by a corporation of all or
a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after the transfer a transferor
or its shareholders or both are in control of the corporation to which the assets are
transferred." INT. Rzv. CODE OF 1939, § 112(g) (1) (D).
6. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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distinguished Gregory on the grounds that in Survaunt the new corpora-
tion continued the corporate enterprise.7
In the Survaunt case, the Government established that the liquidation
and subsequent incorporation were made pursuant to a plan, the net
effect of which satisfied the requirements of a statutory reorganization.
The same statement can be made with respect to every other reincor-
poration case under the 1939 Code in which the Government's position
was sustained."
REINCORPORATION UNDER THE 1954 CODE
The Traditional View
The definition of a D reorganization was the principal statutory pro-
vision relied upon by the Government in the reincorporation cases under
the 1939 Code. This definition was significantly altered in 1954, for
reasons unrelated to the development of the law in the reincorporation
area. Thus, in order to provide unified treatment of corporate divisions
regardless of whether a division was effected by either an exchange or
a distribution, sections 368 (a) (1) (D) and 354 were drafted to require
7. Accord, Liddon v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 304 (6th Cit. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 824 (1956), reversing on other grounds, 22 T.C. 1220 (1954); Becher v. Commis-
sioner, 221 F.2d 252 (2nd Cir. 1955); Bard-Parker Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 52
(2nd Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 906 (1955); Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646
(1st Cit. 1949). But see United States v. Arcade Co., 203 F.2d 230 (6th Cit. 1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 828 (1953), aff'g 97 F. Supp. 942 (M.D. Tenn. 1951). In sustaining
the Government, the courts did not distinguish between those situations where the old
corporation initially transferred property to the new one for the latter's stock and
then distributed the stock along with its other assets; those where the shareholders first
formed a new corporation to which the old corporation sold part of its property and
then proceeded to liquidate; or those where the liquidation was first effected and then
followed by a shareholder transfer to a new corporation.
8. In fact, it has been noted that there is only one case under the 1939 Code where
the Commissioner even contended that liquidation treatment should be denied where
the literal requirements of a statutory reorganization were not clearly satisfied. See
Lane, The Reincorporation Game: Have the Ground Rules Really Changed? 77 HARv.
L. REv. 1218, 1222 (1964). In that case the court denied the Commissioner's contention
and held the reorganization provisions inapplicable upon a finding that the trans-
feror's shareholders held only 69 percent of the transferee's stock. Austin Transit, Inc..
20 T.C. 849 (1953), (Acquiesced in 1954-1 CuM. BuLL. 3.)
9. Section 368(a) (1) (D) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
[T]he term 'regorganization' means-
(D) a transfer by a corporation (of all or a part of its assets to another
corporation) if immediately after the transfer the transferor or one or more
[ ol. 9:928
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that all corporate divisions be tested under the rules of section 355. The
unintended result of this revision in the reincorporation area was to
literally limit the scope of D reorganizations under the 1954 Code, at
least insofar as shareholders were concerned, to transfers of "sub-
stantially all" the assets of the transferor corporation to a controlled
corporation, followed by the liquidation of the transferor corporation.
Under a superficial reading of these provisions, therefore, it would
appear that under the 1954 Code a shareholder might avoid D reorgani-
zation treatment in the context of a liquidation-reincorporation by the
expedient of either retaining a substantial part of the assets of the cor-
poration for subsequent distribution or failing to liquidate the transferor
corporation. Similarly, it would appear that such treatment might also
be avoided in the case of transfers between brother-sister corporations
since in such cases there would rarely be an "exchange" of stock.10
However, as a practical matter, the cases under the 1954 Code indicate
that the courts have been flexible in their approach to the problem and
have refused to be tied to a literal reading of the Code in obvious bail-
out situations.
For instance, in James Armour, Inc.," the taxpayers owned one-hun-
dred percent of two corporations. All of the operating assets of one cor-
poration were sold to the other corporation for cash and an open ac-
count debt. The transferor corporation was then completely liquidated.
The court sustained the Commissioner's determination that the tax-
of its shareholders (including persons who were shareholders immediately
before the transfer), or any combination thereof, is in control of the
corporation to which the assets are transferred; but only if, in pursuance
of the plan, stock or securities of the corporation to which the assets are
transferred are distributed in a transaction which qualifies under section
354, 355, or 356 ...
Section 354 provides, as herein pertinent, as follows:
(a) . . . No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or securities in a
corporation a party to a reorganization are, in pursuance of the plan of
reorganization, exchanged solely for stock or securities in such corpora-
tion or in another corporation a party to the reorganization.
(b) ... Subsection (a) shall not apply to an exchange in pursuance of
a plan of reorganization within the meaning of section 368(a) (1) (D) unless
-- (A) the corporation to which the assets are transferred acquires sub-
stantially all of the assets of the transferor of such assets; and (B) the
stock, securities, and other properties received by such transferor, as well
as the other properties of such transferor, are distributed in pursuance of
the plan of reorganization.
10. See supra, note 9.
11. 43 T.C. 295 (1965).
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payers were in receipt of a "boot" dividend under section 356, on the
grounds that the transactions constituted a D reorganization. In so find-
ing, the court held that the "exchange" requirement of section 354(a)
(1) was met since the one-hundred percent common control obviated
the need for an actual exchange. In addition, the court found that
"substantially all" the assets were transferred within the meaning of
section 354(b) (1) (A), even though the value of the transferred assets
amounted to only fifty-one percent in value of the total assets, since
the assets transferred constituted the basic operating assets of the busi-
ness.12
Likewise, in David T. Grubbs,13 all of the operating assets of a corpor-
ation were sold to a newly created corporation owned by the share-
holders of the transferor corporation. Unlike the situation in Armour,
however, the transferor corporation was not liquidated. Instead, it re-
deemed the stock of all but one of its shareholders and was nominally
utilized by the sole remaining shareholder to operate a financing business.
The court, in finding that a D reorganization had been effected and that
a "boot" dividend had been distributed, concluded that the "liquidation"
requirement of section 354(b) (1) (B) had been satisfied even though no
complete distribution had been made.
On the other hand, it is undoubted that the more restrictive defini-
tion of a D reorganization under the 1954 Code has limited the Govern-
ment's ability to rely upon that definition in denying liquidation treat-
ment. For instance, in Romtmer v. United States, 4 a husband and wife
owned eighty percent of a corporation which owned and operated an
apartment building. After adopting a plan of complete liquidation, the
corporation sold the building to an unrelated corporation for cash and
another apartment building. Because the property being received by the
eighty percent shareholders was a low-rental tenement, they did not
wish to have their names associated with it, nor to incur the personal
responsibility that would result from taking title in their individual
names. Accordingly, the husband and wife shareholders formed a second
corporation in which they were each fifty percent owners. The selling
corporation was then liquidated, the cash being distributed to the share-
12. Accord, John G. Moffatt v. Commissioner, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cit. 1966), aff'g
42 T.C. 558 (1964). See also J. E. Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cit.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967), aff'g in part and reversing in part, 43 T.C.
540 (1965), construing section 356(a) (2) and even citing section 482 in order to prevent
the bailout.
13. 39 T.C. 42 (1962).
14. 268 F. Supp. 740 (D.C. N.J. 1966).
[Vol. 9:928
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holders and the building to the newly-formed corporation. The district
court held that the transaction did not amount to a liquidation-reincor-
poration of the old corporation because the new building, which consti-
tuted ten percent in value of the old corporation's assets, was not an
operating asset of the old corporation prior to its liquidation. In addition,
the court held that the transaction did not amount to a D reorganization
since the transferor corporation did not transfer substantially all of its
assets.
Thus far, we have discussed the administrative and judicial response
to the reincorporation problem under the 1954 Code only insofar as
this response reflects merely the logical extension of concepts developed
under the 1939 Code. Implicit in this approach is the proposition that
liquidation treatment will be denied, if at all, only where the share-
holders of the transferor corporation who continue as shareholders of
the transferee corporation have control of the transferee corporation
as defined for purposes of the statutory reorganization provisions, i.e.,
eighty percent control. The remainder of this article will discuss the
immutability of this proposition 'under the 1954 Code.
Altei-native Approaches
Initial Congressional Response. The first legislative effort designed to
deal explicitly with the reincorporation problem was passed by the
House in 1954.' 5 The bill provided that if the transaction had tax avoid-
ance as a principal purpose, and if the new corporation was formed
within five years of the liquidation of the old corporation, the transfer of
more than fifty percent of the assets of the old corporation (exclusive
of money and securities) to a new corporation in which shareholders of
the old held at least fifty percent of the stock would result, among
other things, in the taxability of the non-reincorporated assets to the
shareholders as a dividend. The bill thus recognized the bailout potential
in cases where the continuing shareholders held as little as a fifty per-
cent interest in the transferee corporation.
This provision was rejected by the Senate. The Senate-House Con-
ference Committee Report contained the following remarks in the
"Statement of the Managers on the Part of the House":
Liquidation followed by reincorporation-The House bill in sec-
tion 357 contained a provision dealing with a device whereby it
has been attempted to withdraw corporate earnings at capital gains
15. H.R. 8300, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
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rates by distributing all the assets of a corporation in complete liq-
uidation and promptly reincorporating the business assets. .This
provision gave rise to certain technical problems and it has not
been retained in the bill as recommended by the accompanying
conference report. It is the belief of the managers in the part of
the House that, at the present time, the possibility of tax avoid-
ance in this area is not sufficiently serious to require a special
statutory provision. It is believed that this possibility can appro-
priately be disposed of by judicial decision or by regulation with-
in the framework of the other provisions of the bill.16
Administrative Response. The Treasury Department immediately
moved to accept this invitation by promulgating regulations in support
of the general proposition that when some shareholders of a liquidating
corporation take a proprietary interest in the corporation which suc-
ceeds to its business, the liquidation might be disregarded:
A liquidation which is followed by a transfer to another corpora-
tion of all or part of the assets of the liquidating corporation or
which is preceded by such a transfer may ... have the effect of
the distribution of a dividend or of a transaction in which no
loss is recognized and gain is recognized only to the extent of.
"other property." See sections 301 and 356,17
The regulations under section 301 provide:
A distribution to shareholders with respect to their stock is with-
in the terms of section 301 although it takes place at the same time
as another transaction if the distribution is in substance a separate
transaction whether or not connected in a formal sense. This is
most likely to occur in the case of a recapitalization, a reincorpo-
ration, or a merger of a corporation with a newly organized cor-
poration having substantially no property.'8
The general purport of these regulatory provisions19 was incorporated
16. H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83rd Cong, 2d Sess., 41 (1954) (emphasis added).
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.331-1(c) (1955).
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(e) (1) (1955).
19. These provisions suggest at least two propositions: (1) that the result reached
in Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947), has not been pre-empted under the
1954 Code; and (2) that a distribution functionally may be unrelated to a reorganiza-
don under some circumstances. The first proposition is of only tangential importance
[Vol. 9:928
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by the Commissioner in Rev. Rul. 61-156.o In that ruling, it was held
that a transaction cast in the form of a sale by one corporation of its
assets to a newly organized corporation (in which the shareholders of
the selling corporation were to own only forty-five percent of the out-
standing stock) and a subsequent liquidation of the selling corporation,
might be considered, in substance, as a reorganization under section 368,
rather than a transaction governed by the provisions of section 337 and
331.
This revenue ruling marked the Commissioner's first significant indi-
cation that liquidation treatment might be denied in the reincorporation
area where the continuing shareholders retained less than an eighty per-
cent stock interest in the transferee corporation.
In attempting to recast the transactions in question as a reorganizaion,
however, the Commissioner was obliged to contend with section 368 (c)
of the Code which provides generally, as did its counterpart under the
1939 Code, that for purposes of the reorganization provisions, the term
"9control" means the ownership of stock possessing at least eighty per-
cent of the total combined voting power of all voting stock. To do this,
he adopted the following approach:
In this case, if the issuance of stock to the new investors is disre-
in the reincorporation area and is discussed briefly at this point only for the sake of
completeness.
In Bazley, the Supreme Court held that an exchange by the shareholders of a family
corporation of all of its common stock for new common stock plus debenture bonds
(payable in ten years but callable at any time) of a principal amount of $400,000 was
not a "recapitalization", as that term is used in the reorganization provisions. The
Court concluded that receipt of the debentures constituted dividend income in an
amount equal to the fair market value of the debentures. The Court noted that the
debentures produced, for all practical purposes, the same result as a distribution of
cash earnings of equivalent value, particularly since they were callable at the will of
the corporation which in this case was the will of the taxpayer.
The 1954 Code purports to be a restatement of the principle stated by the Supreme
Court in Bazley. See sections 356(d), 354(a) (2); S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess.
269 (1954). However, the cited Code provisions actually provide that where securities
are received in a qualified reorganization under the Code, and the principal amount of
such securities received exceeds the principal amount of any securities surrendered, the
fair market value of such excess is "boot". The important point to be recognized
is that the regulatory provisions as amplified by the example following § 1.301-1(1) in-
dicate that the result in the Bazley case-dividend income in an amount equal to the
fair market value of the debentures-may still be sought in appropriate cases notwith-
standing the fact that Congress has purported to adopt and codify that rule in sections
354 and 356 of the Code.
20. 1961-2 CuM. BuLL. 62, revoking, Rev. Rul. 56-541, 1956-2 CuM. BuLy. 189.
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garded, there is clearly a mere recapitalization and reincorpora-
tion coupled with a withdrawal of funds....
The issuance of stock to new investors can be disregarded as
being a separate transaction, since even without it the dominant
purpose-to withdraw corporate earnings while continuing the
equity interest in substantial part in a business enterprise conducted
in corporate form-was fully achieved. The issuance of stock to
new investors was not needed to implement the dominant purpose
and, therefore, the rest of the transaction was not fruitless with-
out it and so dependent on it.21
Judicial Response. This theory-that an apparently unified transac-
tion might be separated into its component parts for tax purposes-has
received some judicial support in the reincorporation area. In Reef
Corporation v. Commnissioner,2 all the stock of old Reef (a Texas cor-
poration) was owned by two groups of stockholders. The Butler Group,
which operated the company, owned approximately fifty-two percent;
the Favrot Group, which was comprised mainly of investors, owned
forty-eight percent. In 1958, the Butler Group decided to have the
corporation buy out the Favrot Group for $2,920,800 in cash and notes.
Pursuant to this intention, a plan was formulated whereby the Butler
Group organized new Reef (a Delaware corporation) and became the
owner of all its stock. Then both the Butler and Favrot Groups sold
their stock in old Reef to the Strong Trust, the Favrot Group receiving
$2,920,800 in notes and cash and the Butler Group $2,624,400 in notes.
Simultaneously, old Reef sold its operating assets to new Reef for notes
in identical face amounts to those issued by the Strong Trust. Old
Reef was then liquidated and the Strong Trust (its sole shareholder)
received cash and notes equal to the cash and notes it had paid for old
Reef's stock. The trust immediately pledged the notes received from
new Reef to secure the notes issued to the Butler and Favrot Groups
and, in accordance with the terms of its original notes, the Trust was
thereby relieved of all personal liability for payment of either interest
or principal.
The net result of this complex series of steps was as follows: The
business which had been operated by old Reef continued without inter-
ruption under a new corporate charter (new Reef) with the same man-
21. Id. at 63.
22. 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 US. 1018 (1967), aff'g in part and
rev'g and remanding in part, 24 T.C.M. 379 (1965).
[Vol. 9:928
1968] THE REINCORPORATION PROBLEM IN SUBCHAPTER C 937
agement, employees and customers. The Butler Group's ownership in
the corporate enterprise was increased from fifty-two percent to one
hundred percent, while the Favrot Group's forty-eight percent owner-
ship was completely redeemed.
New Reef claimed that because of this change it was entitled to,
among other things, a stepped-up basis for depreciation in the assets
received from old Reef. New Reef further claimed that old Reef's
taxable year terminated at the time of the transaction. The court of
appeals first held that the transaction constituted a D reorganization.
Although this holding denied the transferee-corporation a stepped-up
basis for the assets, the question of whether the new and old corpora-
tions were sufficiently distinct so that the old company should file a tax
return for the partial taxable year ending with the reorganization and
the new corporation file a separate tax return beginning with the date
of the reorganization turned on whether the transaction qualified as an
F as well as a D reorganization. 3
In holding that an F reorganization had taken place, the court of
appeals stated as follows:
... Distilled to their pure substance, two distinct and unrelated
events transpired. First, the holders of 48 percent of the stock in
[old] Reef had their stockholdings completely redeemed. Second,
new Reef was formed and the assets of [old] Reef were trans-
ferred to new Reef. The business enterprise continued without
interruption during both the redemption and the change in corpor-
ate vehicles.
Much confusion flows from the fact that the corporate reor-
ganization took place simultaneously with the stock redemption.
But taking the Code as a standard, these two elements were func-
tionally unrelated. [Old] Reef could have completely redeemed
the stock of 48 percent of its shareholders without changing the
state of its incorporation.
If a corporation did no more than completely redeem the stock
interest belonging to 48 percent of its shareholders, it could not
23. Section 381, which was enacted for the first time in 1954, provides, as herein
pertinent, that when an F reorganization takes place, the old corporation does not file
a separate income tax return for the portion of the year ending on the date of the
reorganization; the new corporation is regarded as a continuation of the old. However,
if the reorganization does not qualify as an F, the old corporation's taxable year ends
on the date of the reorganization. See section 381 (b).
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under the Code make wholesale accounting method changes. Like-
wise, if a corporation did no more than change its name and state
of incorporation, it could not under the Code make wholesale
accounting method changes. Combining these two events, neither
of which would be sufficient alone, will not permit a corporation
to make wholesale accounting method changes. Nothing in the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 contemplates such a result.24
Similarly, in Davant v. Commissioner,25 two corporations were each
owned in equal proportions by four families. Through a series of steps
involving the purchase of the stock of one of the corporations by a
straw man, all of the operating assets of one corporation were trans-
ferred to the second corporation for $700,000 in cash. The transferor
corporation was then liquidated, ultimately distributing a total of ap-
proximately $900,000 to the four families. Having determined that the
series of steps was an integrated transaction, the court was then faced
with the question whether the earnings and profits of the transferor and
transferee corporations should be combined in determining whether the
full $900,000 cash received by the shareholders should be treated as a
dividend. In holding that the $700,000 received indirectly from the
transferee and the $200,000 received from the transferor must be tested
against the combined earnings and profits, the court stated:
The fact that we held the transfer of [the transferor's] assets and
the "sale"-liquidation of [its] stock should be viewed as an inte-
grated transaction does not mean that we are being inconsistent
when we separate the distribution of [the transferee corporation's]
cash to its stockholders. We are merely recognizing that two dis-
tinct and functionally unrelated types of transactions were carried
on simultaneously-one was a dividend and the other a reorganiza-
tion. The Code does the same thing in section 356. It recognizes
that a series of complicated events may occur which are legitimate-
ly a reorganization. These are not taxed. Simultaneously, a tax-
payer may receive boot having the effect of a dividend. The div-
idend's only relation to the reorganization is that it occurred at
the- same time. The boot where appropriate is taxed as a dividend.
[The transferee corporation], if it chose, could have declared the
$700,000 as a dividend before a reorganization with [the trans-
24. Reef Corporation v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125, 134, 137 (5th Cir. 1966).
25. 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967), aff'g in part and
rev'g in part, 43 T.C. 540 (1965).
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feror] ever took place. Or [it] could have waited and a week, a
month or a year later distributed this dividend. Had it chosen any
of these courses, the reorganization involving [the transferor]
would not have been affected in the slightest. We, therefore, hold
that the $700,000 received by petitioners from [the transferee] is a
distribution governed .by sections 301(a), 301(c) and 316. The
same reasoning demonstrates that $200,000 coming from [the
transferor] was a dividend since it was functionally unrelated to-
the reorganization. We, therefore, hold that the $200,000 received
by petitioner from [the transferor] is a distribution governed by
sections 301(a), 301(c) and 316.26
Although, as the opinions of the Reef and Davant courts indicate, an
integrated transaction may properly be separated into its component
parts in order to determine the substance of the transaction for tax
purposes, the courts have not as yet applied this rationale in the context
of Rev. Rul. 61-156. Otherwise stated, where, as in that revenue ruling,
the liquidation-reincorporation plan contemplates that the shareholders
of the transferor corporation who are to continue the enterprise will
have less than an eighty percent stock interest in the transferee cor-
poration, the courts thus far have refused to hold that the infusion of
new shareholders into the enterprise can be separated from the liquida-
tion-reincorporation, or reorganization, aspect of the transactionsY
For instance, in Joseph C. Gallagher,8 distributions in redemption of
all the stock of a corporation were made pursuant to a plan under which
corporate operating assets were sold to a newly incorporated company,
seventy-three percent owned by old company shareholders. The plan
was initiated to eliminate certain inactive shareholders from the company
and to issue stock to certain employees who previously had not been
shareholders. The Commissioner took the position that the twenty-seven
percent stock interest purchased in the new corporation by the em-
ployees should be disregarded and reorganization treatment applied to
the redemption, relying on the proposition that the step could be dis-
regarded since without it the dominant purpose-to withdraw corporate
earnings while continuing the equity interest in substantial part-was
fully achieved. The court answered this argument as follows:
26. Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874, 888-89 (5th Cir. 1966) (footnote omitted).
27. In this connection, it should be recalled that both the Reef and Davant cases
dealt with a situation where the continuing shareholders ended up with one-hundred
percent control of the transferee corporation.
28. 39 T.C. 144 (1962), appeal dismissed pursuant to stipulation, September 23, 1963.
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Respondent... contends that some of the steps actually taken can
be disregarded. But, at least in such a situation as this, we cannot
justify the inclusion of some and the exclusion of other essential
steps. 29
Are the Reorganization Provisions Pre-Emptive?
The Proposition. The significance of this latter proposition becomes
clear only when considered in connection with another proposition that
the Gallagher case announces: that under the 1954 Code, liquidation
treatment cannot be denied in a reincorporation context unless the net
effect of the transaction satisfies the requirements of a statutory reor-
ganization. The Gallagher court stated:
The basic approach of the complicated series of enactments incor-
porated in the 1954 Code appears to be that all such situations are
to be tested by the "reorganization" portion of the statute, and
that it was intended that if a transaction of a similar kind does
not fall within them, but lies in the general area of arrangements
which may, in effect, constitute the continuation of an existing
business, it shall be treated as a transaction giving rise to gain or
loss and not as a distribution.30
The juxtaposition of the foregoing propositions by the courts in the
reincorporation cases under the 1954 Code has resulted in a government
loss in every case in which the continuity of shareholder interest has
dropped below eighty percent." It is submitted that neither of these
propositions is either immutable or axiomatic.
First, it would appear that the first of these propositions-that the step
transaction doctrine precludes separating the infusion of new share-
holders into an enterprise from the liquidation and reincorporation of
that enterprise-cannot be squared with the opinions of the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Reef and Davant. As we have seen, in
Reef, a contemporaneous redemption and reorganization were separated;
in Davant, a contemporaneous distribution and reorganization were sep-
29. Id. at 156-57 (footnote omitted).
30. Id. at 157-58 (footnote omitted).
31. E.g., Commissioner v. Hyman H. Berghash, 361 F.2d 257 (2nd Cir. 1966), aff'g
43 T.C. 743 (1965); Joseph C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. 144 (1962); Turner Advertising of
Kentucky, Inc., 25 T.C.M. 532 (1966); Book Production Industries, Inc., 24 T.C.M. 339
(1965).
Vol. 9:928
19681 THE REINCORPORATION PROBLEM IN SUBCHAPTER C 941
arated.32 Logically, there would seem to be no distinction between
what the appellate court did in Reef and Davant, and what the Tax
Court refused to do in Gallagher.
Nevertheless, it is believed that the reluctance of the courts to ascribe
to the "functionally unrelated" theory adopted by the Reef and Davant
courts in cases such as Gallagher stems in no small part from the strict
adherence to the second proposition discussed above: that if, upon ex-
amination of the net effect of a liquidation-reincorporation, the result
does not satisfy the statutory definition of a reorganization, the liquida-
tion and reincorporation must be given independent significance for
tax purposes.
Support for the Proposition. Support for the proposition that the
finding of a statutory reorganization is the sine qua non of the denial
of liquidation treatment in a reincorporation case under the 1954 Code
was found by the Gallagher court in the following statement of the
Senate Finance Committee made in connection with the redrafting of
Subchapter C:
* . . Under your committee's bill, Part I of the subchapter con-
tains rules primarily devoted to the treatment of current distribu-
tions by a corporation, and does not contain rules ivith respect to
distributions pursuant to a recapitalization or other type of re-
organization. Part II, as under the House bill, contains rules re-
lating primarily to liquidations. Part III relates only to reorganiza-
tions and includes their effects on the shareholders....
Part I of Subchapter C provides rules relating to the tax treat-
ment to shareholders of corporate distributions of property. While
your committee continues the treatment provided in the House bill
under which Part I has no application at the corporate level to
distributions of property in complete or partial liquidation, your
committee's bill, unlike the House bill, does not include in Part I
rules for distributions made in connection with corporate reor-
ganizations. Under your committee's bill, distributions and ex-
changes made in connection with reorganization transactions are
treated, in general, in Part III.33
32. Moreover, the courts have drawn upon the doctrine in a number of cases our-
side the liquidation-reincorporation area. See, e.g., American Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C.
397 (1948), aff'd 177 F.2d 513 (3rd Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950); Scien-
tific Instrument Co., 17 T.C. 1253 (1952), aff'd 202 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1953); National
Bellas Hess, Inc., 20 T.C. 636 (1953), aff'd 220 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1955).
33. S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 43, 230 (1954) (emphasis added).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The Gallagher court found additional support for the pre-emptive
role of the reorganization provisions in the reincorporation cases under
the 1954 Code in the absence of court decisions ". . . either under the
1954 Code or under the less restrictive language of the preceding rev-
enue acts, in which a liquidation-reincorporation has been held to give
rise to ordinary income, except where the result could be accomplished
by applying the provisions relating to reorganizations." 34
It would appear that this support is illusory. First, the lack of author-
ity can be explained simply by noting that the issue of the pre-emptive
role of the reorganization provisions in the reincorporation area appears
to have been reached by the courts for the first time in the Gallagher
case. Second, although the Senate Finance Committee Report" indicates
that the rules relating to reorganizations are contained in part III of
Subchapter C, it does not set forth guidelines for determining when
any particular series of transactions constitute a reorganization. Fur-
thermore, the mere fact that every government victory in the reincor-
poration area prior to 1954 was characterized by the finding of a statu-
tory reorganization hardly requires the conclusion that such a finding
is a prerequisite to the denial of liquidation treatment under the 1954
Code in the context of a reincorporation. Neither the language of the
1954 Code nor its legislative history supports such a statement. If any-
thing, the statement of the House managers in respect of the deletion
of section 357 of H.R. 8300 36-that the reincorporation problem "can
appropriately be disposed of . . . within the framework of the other
provisions of the bill"-would seem to indicate just the contrary.
The Case for the Redemption Provisions. Moreover, there is some
support in the legislative history of the 1954 Code for the proposition
that the redemption provisions, and not the reorganization provisions,
may be applied under some circumstances in a reincorporation case
under the 1954 Code. Thus, in reincorporation cases under the 1954
Code, shareholders seeking capital gain treatment contend that the
transferor corporation has been liquidated within the meaning of section
331. Since 1924, a liquidating distribution has been treated as the pro-
ceeds of a sale of the stock by the shareholder. In reporting the bil]
which became the Revenue Act of 1924, the Senate Finance Committee
said:
34. Joseph C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. 144, 160 (1962).,
35. S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 43, 230 (1954).
36. H.R. REP. No, 8300, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954).
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The bill treats a liquidating dividend as a sale of the stock, with
the result that the gain to the taxpayer is treated not as a [taxable]
dividend ... but as a gain from the sale of property which may
be treated as a capital gain.... A liquidating dividend is, in effect,
a sale by the stockholder of his stock to the corporation; he sur-
renders his interest in the corporation and receives money in place
thereof...37
This "sale" treatment of liquidating distributions has been carried over
under the 1954 Code in section 331. In discussing the tax treatment of
such distributions under Subchapter C, the Senate Finance Committee
Report makes the following comment:
Section 331 restates in effect the provisions of section 115(c) of
the 1939 Code by providing.., that amounts distributed in...
liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as. . . payment in ex-
change for the stock of the shareholder .... Such portion of see-
don 115(c) . . . which provides for capital gains treatment where
the redemption does not terminate a part of the business of the
corporation is... treated under section 302, or section 301, as the
case may be.32
In view of the foregoing, it would appear that neither the language
of the 1954 Code nor its legislative history supports the proposition that
the reorganization provisions provide the sole standard for testing rein-
corporations under the 1954 Code, and that in appropriate cases, such
transactions should be treated as distributions in redemption, the tax
effect of which is determined under section 302 of the Code.
What is an appropriate case? Certainly, each case must turn on its
own facts. However, the following example is indicative of a situation
in which the redemption theory might appropriately be applied to deny
capital gains treatment. Assume that X is the founder and seventy-five-
percent shareholder of A corporation, a successful drycleaning estab-
lishment. Y is a twenty-five percent shareholder and key employee of
A. A's operating assets are worth $100,000. Its only other assets are
cash in the amount of $100,000. Its accumulated earnings and profits
account equals $100,000. Y is interested in leaving A corporation. X
is interested in having Z replace Y. X is also interested in removing some
37. S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1939-I (Part 2) CUM. BuLL.
266, 274 (emphasis added).
33. S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 255 (1954) (emphasis added).
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or all of the liquid assets from the corporation, but is not willing to do
so if he must sustain tax at ordinary income rates as a consequence.
Accordingly, pursuant to plan, the following steps are taken: Corpora-
tion A adopts a plan of complete liquidation. X creates new corporation
B. Corporation A sells its operating assets to B for seventy-five shares of
B stock and B's note for $25,000. Corporation A liquidates, distributing
the B stock and $50,000 to X and $50,000 to Y. Z then contributes
$25,000 to B in exchange for twenty-five shares of B stock. Both X and
Y report capital gain on the liquidation. The Commissioner asserts a
deficiency against X39 on the ground that the distribution to X is essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend under section 302 (b) (1) and thus is tax-
able as a distribution under section 301 .40 The court, having observed
the form of the transactions involved and noting their net result, agrees
with the Commissioner that the transactions in question were indeed part
of a liquidation-reincorporation plan with the continuing shareholder
retaining a seventy-five percent interest in the transferee corporation. It
is submitted that, under these circumstances, the court cannot dispose of
the case by concluding that such a series of transactions can only be
39. No deficiency would be asserted against Y since his interest was completely
terminated. See sections 302(a) and 302(b) (3).
40. The basis for such a dividend equivalency determination is obvious when, in
measuring the net effect of the redemption, consideration is given to the fact that X
has received a stock interest in B identical to that he previously had in A. See William
H. Grimditch, 37 B.T.A. 402 (1938). Suppose however that X did not receive an
identical interest but received something less-for example, a 50% interest. Under
these facts X's proprietary interest in the enterprise has been reduced by 33Y3%. Such
a percentage reduction might result in a finding that the redemption was not essentially
equivalent to a dividend. This raises the question whether all of the cash X receives
should be accorded capital gain treatment or only part thereof. Probably only part
should be treated as capital gain under section 302(a). It should be remembered that
the initial distribution by A was made with respect to all of its shares. Thus to the
extent those shares are replaced in X's hands with B shares, it would not seem appro-
priate to allocate the cash paid for such replaced shares to those that were not re-
placed. If the cash distribution is allocated on a per share basis to the A shares
redeemed from X, then that part of the distribution relating to the replaced shares
would be given dividend treatment for failure to meet the test of section 302(b) (1). On
the other hand, the cash distributed with respect to A shares that were not replaced
with B shares would meet the test of section 302(b) (1) and would thus be entitled to
the capital gain treatment provided in section 302(a).
This is not to say that section 302 necessarily represents the sole alternative provision
of Subchapter C available for determining the proper tax treatment of net distributions
to continuing shareholders in a reincorporated enterprise. Thus, consistent with the
single entity approach, a net distribution which effected a true corporate contraction
might well qualify as a partial liquidation within the meaning of section 346. See
section 346(c); S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 261-62 (1954).
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termed a "reorganization," and since the continuing shareholder has not
retained an eighty percent controlling interest, the reorganization provi-
sions of the statute have not been met, with the result that the continuing
shareholder is entitled to capital gains treatment.
The Viabiliy of the Redemption Rationale. Although it might appear
that the courts have been given numerous opportunities to adopt the
redemption rationale in less than eighty percent cases, and that the Gov-
ernment has argued for redemption-type treatment with respect to the
continuing shareholders in each or most of these cases, a fair reading
of these cases discloses that the theory has not really had its day in court.
In each of these cases, the Government, relying upon the theory of
Rev. Rul. 61-156, has argued primarily that the addition of new share-
holders to the continuing enterprise is functionally unrelated to the
"reorganization", with the result that it qualifies as a reorganization of
the D, E or F type."' In most of these cases, the proposition that there
has been no complete liquidation and thus the distribution should be
treated as a distribution under section 302 and 301 has been argued only
alternatively. Only recently has substantial reliance been placed upon
the redemption-distribution argument.42
Moreover, and perhaps more important, it appears that in the two
leading cases where the redemption-distribution theory has been argued,
the court's decision has not been wholly incompatible with the pro-
visions of section 302.
Thus, in Gallagher, a Delaware corporation for many years had car-
ried on a successful stevedoring business and, in 1955, had accumulated
approximately $1,000,000 in earned surplus. During this period several
of the original shareholders died, with their stock descending to widows
and estates. At the same time other managerial personnel had entered the
corporation's business, but had not received any stock interest. In order
to afford equity ownership to the new personnel, eliminate the inactive
shareholders, and withdraw the substantial earned surplus, the share-
holders voted to dissolve the corporation. A new corporation was
formed by 61.95 percent of the shareholders, who received 72 2/3 per-
cent of the stock. The new corporation purchased the operating assets
of the old corporation and carried on the same business as the old cor-
41. Section 368(a) (1) provides, in part, as follows: "[Tihe term 'reorganization'
means . . . (E) a recapitalization; or (F) a mere change in identity, form, or place of
organization, however effected."
42. Brief for petitioner, Commissioner v. Berghash, 361 F.2d 257 (2nd Cit. 1966).
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poration. The old corporation then liquidated and the shareholders
reported the distributions received as capital gain. The Commissioner
determined deficiencies with respect to at least four of the five continu-
ing shareholders, on the ground that the amounts which they received
were taxable in full as ordinary dividends. The following table sum-
marizes the bases, proportionate interests, and distributions of the five
continuing shareholders:
Basis in Basis in
Int. in Stock Int. in Stock
Old of Old New of New Distributions
Name Corp. Corp. Corp. Corp. Received
Bush 30.24% $59,209.36 30% $90,000.00 $326,142.17
Cuffe 20.65% 26,700.00 10% 30,000.00 222,710.94
Gallagher 4.49% 15,206.00 21% 63,000.00 48,380.58
Grant 4.41% 14,943.82 6.67% 20,000.00 47,542.22
Burkman 43  2.16% Not Shown 5% 15,000.00 23,356.94
Regardless of how it might be expressed technically, the underlying
objection of the Commissioner in this case was that the purported sale
to the new corporation and liquidation of the old should not provide
more favorable tax treatment than a distribution by a single continuing
entity since it had the same practical effect. So viewed, it would appear
that no deficiency should have been determined against either petitioner
Gallagher or Cuffe. With respect to Gallagher, since he received distri-
butions totaling only $48,380.58 from the old corporation, but con-
tributed $63,000.00 to the new corporation, he should not have been
taxed upon any theory. With respect to Cuffe, and again considering
the distribution as one by a single continuing entity, in view of the sub-
stantial reduction in his percentage interest in the enterprise, it neces-
sarily would have constituted a substantially disproportionate redemp-
tion to him under section 302 (b) (2). As a result, his tax consequences
would not have differed significantly from those claimed on his return.44
43. The fifth continuing shareholder, Mr. Burkman, aparently did not petition to the
Tax Court. Whether a deficiency was asserted against him does not appear from the
court's opinion or from the briefs filed.
44. There is some slight difference between the two but it appears to be in the
Service's favor. Thus, Cuffe apparently reported capital gains of $196,000, computed
by applying his full basis of $27,000 against distributions of $223,000. Under the
Service's theory, he would have applied only an aliquot portion of his basis, ap-
proximately one-half of the $27,000, against net distribution of $193,000 ($223,000 less
$30,000 invested in the new company), thereby realizing $180,000 in gains.
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Therefore, regardless of any shortcomings in the rationale adopted by
the Tax Court, its findings as to petitioners Gallagher and Cuffe are
unassailable.
Similarly, in Coimnissioner v. Berghah,45 taxpayer Berghash was the
owner of a successful drug store corporation 6 with substantial excess
cash and large accumulated earnings. He agreed to sell a fifty percent
interest in that corporation to Lettman, a key corporate employee. Al-
though both parties mutually valued the operating assets (exclusive of
cash) at $121,101.64, Berghash knew that the maximum amount Lett-
man could pay for a fifty percent interest was $25,000. Accordingly,
steps were taken pursuant to sections 337 and 331 to distribute the excess
corporate cash to Berghash and to otherwise reduce the total value of
the common stock to $50,000, to enable Lettman to acquire a fifty
percent stock interest, and leave Berghash owning the other fifty per-
cent. Berghash received from the old corporation as a liquidating dis-
tribution the following assets: fifty percent of the stock of the new
corporation (valued, as noted above, at $25,000), a negotiable promis-
sory note of the new corporation (in the principal amount of $96,101.64
and payable at the rate of $1,000 per month plus six percent interest on
the remaining balance) and cash in the amount of $49,313.17.
The Berghashes reported the gain on the liquidation of the old cor-
poration as long-term capital gain with gross proceeds of $170,414.81, a
cost basis of $2,211.46, and capital gain of $168,203.35. The Commis-
sioner issued a notice of deficiency asserting that the distributions
received by the Berghashes were in the nature of a dividend and thus
taxable to the extent of the old corporation's earnings and profits
($122,050.11) at ordinary income rates, plus long-term capital gain
of $48,364.70.
At least two factors militated against a government victory under the
single entity-redemption theory in Berghash. First, the argument that
section 302 should be applied in respect of the distributions to Berghash
was not raised in the Tax Court. Second, it would appear that Berghash
had at least a colorable claim to some additional capital gain treatment47
45. 361 F.2d 257 (2nd Cir. 1966), af'g 43 T.C. 743 (1965).
46. One percent of the capital stock was actually owned by Berghash's wife, but for
convenience and unless otherwise indicated, Berghash will be referred to as the sole
shareholder.
47. See note 40, supra.
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under section 302(b) (1) in view of the reduction in his percentage
ownership of the enterprise from one-hundred to fifty percent.4"
It would appear appropriate at this juncture to consider what, if any,
judicial predisposition exists to sustain the Government in a liquidation-
reincorporation case where the continuing shareholders wind up with
less than eighty percent of the equity interest in the continuing cor-
poration. In the liquidation-reincorporation cases themselves, the only
ray of light for the Government thus far appears in an opinion of the
Fourth Circuit in Pridernark, Inc. v. Commissioner,49 rendered subse-
quent to the Tax Court's decision in Bergbasb. In that case, the owner
of eighty percent of the old corporation's common stock took a sixty-
one percent interest in the new corporation, and he signed stock op-
tions which, if exercised, would reduce his holdings to forty-four per-
cent. Judge Sobeloff, speaking for the court, noted:
The Code provides no definition of "complete liquidation."
[An] indication of what distributions are meant to be accorded
favored treatment is found in an early report of the Senate Finance
Committee. S. Rept. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1924). There
a distribution in complete liquidation was analogized to a sale of
stock in that the shareholder "surrenders his interest in the cor-
poration and receives money in place thereof." The corporation
must have ceased to be a going corporate concern, or if the
enterprise is continued in corporate form, the shareholder must
have disassociated himself from it. See Regs. 1.332-2(c) (1955). 50
Having so stated, however, the court concluded that where, as was
found as fact in that case, "the liquidated business is not resumed by the
new corporation as a continuation of a going concern, there is a 'com-
plete liquidation.'
Outside of the liquidation-reincorporation area, one recent decision
lends significant support for the denial of liquidation treatment in rein-
corporation cases beyond the confines of the reorganization provisions.
In Wolf v. Comnissioner,5 2 petitioners were partners in a limited part-
48. Militating against taxpayers' argument is the fact that Berghash retained an abso-
lute option to repurchase Lettman's stock interest.
49. 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), aff'g in part and reversing in part, 42 T.C. 510
(1964).
50. 345 F.2d 35, 41 (4th Cir. 1965).
51. Id.
52. 357 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1966), aff'g 43 T.C. 652 (1965).
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nership which held as its only significant asset one-third of the stock
of Harron, Richard and McCone Co. (hereinafter referred to as Har-
ron). The only significant partnership liabilities were two promissory
notes issued to Haynes and White, each of whom owned one-third of
the stock of Harron.
In order to eliminate dissension which had arisen among the share-
holders, White and Haynes agreed to dispose of their Harron stock.
Pursuant to plan, a new corporation was formed. The partnership trans-
ferred its stock in Harron to the new corporation in exchange for com-
mon stock. The new corporation also assumed the partnership's notes.
The new corporation then sold one thousand shares of its preferred
stock, the proceeds of the sale being used as a down payment in the
purchase of the Harron stock from White and Haynes. The new cor-
poration, as sole stockholder of Harron, merged Harron into it and as-
sumed Harron's name.
The Commissioner determined deficiencies on the grounds that the
assumption of the partnership's liability constituted the payment of a
dividend to the partnership, and that the transaction did not qualify
under section 351. In sustaining the Commissioner, the Tax Court noted:
Viewing all the steps taken as parts of a single transaction, as both
parties agree they should be considered, and looking to the sub-
stance and net effect of the transactions, we think that in reality it
was Harron which redeemed the stock of White and Haynes and
assumed and paid the personal liability of Partnership. It is true, as
the petitioners point out, that Machinery was a valid corporation
and that legally and technically it was the entity which survived
the merger. However, we think it immaterial which corporation
continued. The effect was the same as if Harron had continued
and Machinery had been put to death. Under the circumstances,
we think the use of Machinery cannot be deemed sufficient to es-
tablish an exchange within the contemplation of section 351. 53
The significance of this holding for present purposes is the recogni-
tion by the court that an exchange in form was not an exchange within
the meaning of section 351. In the context of the liquidation-reincor-
poration cases, the Government must sustain an analogous proposition:
that a liquidation in form is not a liquidation within the meaning of
section 331 or 337. The analogy would appear to be strong.
53. William F. Wolf, Jr. 43 T.C. 652, 661 (1965) (footnote omitted).
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CONCLUSION
The reincorporation problem traditionally has been treated by the
Commissioner and the courts within the framework of the reorgaiiza-
non provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. However, as has been
shown, under some circumstances, the only sigmficant economic effect
of a completed liquidation-reincorporation relates to a shift of proprie-
tary control of a continuing business enterprise effected in part by a
distribution of the earnings and profits of that enterprise to its share-
holders. Under such circumstances, the distributions take on the ap-
pearance of stock redemptions.
Subchapter C of the 1954 Code contains rules describing the tax treat-
ment of distributions in redemption of stock and distributions in con-
nection with corporate reorganizations. However, the Code does not
provide rules for determining whether any particular series of trans-
actions involving distributions by a continuing enterprise constitutes a
redemption or a reorganization. This determination is initially left to
the Commissioner, subject, of course, to ultimate judicial review
It is submitted that the intent of Congress in enacting Subchapter C
cannot be given full effect without making this determination. More-
over, as we have seen, neither the language of the Code nor its legisla-
tive history supports the proposition that the use of more than one cor-
poration to effect a corporate distribution ipso facto requires that the
tax treatment of that distribution be determined only under the reor-
ganization provisions. On the contrary, the statutory scheme demands,
rather than forecloses, a determination of the true substance of the
transaction within the scope of all of Subchapter C.
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